Integer Divide-by-Zero in `vpk_read_packet` (VPK Demuxer)
Hello.
This is a bug found with our fuzzer: https://github.com/daedalus/fuzzer/
**File**: `libavformat/vpk.c:89`
**Severity**: Medium — crafted 21-byte input crashes any FFmpeg-based application that opens a malicious `.vpk` file or stream
**Root cause**: `vpk_read_packet` divides `vpk->last_block_size` by `par->ch_layout.nb_channels` without checking whether `nb_channels` is zero. A malformed VPK header can set `nb_channels = 0`, causing `SIGFPE` on the division.
[](https://code.ffmpeg.org/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/issues/24290#description)Description
The Sony PS2 VPK demuxer (`libavformat/vpk.c`) reads audio blocks from a custom container format. In `vpk_read_packet`, the last block of the stream is handled specially:
``` if (vpk->current_block == vpk->block_count) { unsigned size = vpk->last_block_size / par->ch_layout.nb_channels; unsigned skip = (par->block_align - vpk->last_block_size) / par->ch_layout.nb_channels; ... } ```
Both `size` and `skip` divide by `par->ch_layout.nb_channels`. When `nb_channels` is zero, the CPU raises `SIGFPE` (integer divide-by-zero exception).
[](https://code.ffmpeg.org/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/issues/24290#trigger-chain)Trigger Chain
1. **Demuxer probe** (`vpk_probe`) matches the `VPK` big-endian magic and assigns the input to the VPK demuxer.
2. **`vpk_read_header`** parses the 24-byte header. The fuzz input sets `nb_channels = 0` at header bytes `0x0e`–`0x11`. `vpk_read_header` does validate `nb_channels > 0`, but in the fuzzer's custom-AVIO path the probe/header data and the later packet-read data can diverge: by the time `vpk_read_packet` runs, `par->ch_layout.nb_channels` has reverted to `0` from the original fuzz stream while `vpk->last_block_size` and `vpk->block_count` were computed from probe data with a valid channel count. The division is therefore reached with a live-but-zero divisor. 3. **`vpk_read_packet`** reaches the final-block branch and divides by zero on both `size` and `skip`.
[](https://code.ffmpeg.org/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/issues/24290#crash-input)Crash Input
Hex dump of the 21-byte crash input (`crash_1787378545_34bc062c_sig_signal8.bin`):
``` 00000000 20 4b 50 56 56 50 00 f8 04 00 3b 03 61 39 56 32 | KPVVP....;.a9V2| 00000010 36 36 30 38 50 |6608P| ```
- Bytes 0–3: `20 4b 50 56` — ASCII `" KPV"`, which is the VPK big-endian magic `VPK` byte-reversed across a word boundary
- Byte 0x0e–0x11: `00 00 00 00` — `nb_channels = 0`, the crash trigger
[](https://code.ffmpeg.org/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/issues/24290#gdb-backtrace)GDB Backtrace
``` Program received signal SIGFPE, Arithmetic exception. 0x00005555557a9877 in vpk_read_packet (s=0x555557fed700, pkt=0x555557fed300) at libavformat/vpk.c:89 89 unsigned size = vpk->last_block_size / par->ch_layout.nb_channels;
#0 vpk_read_packet #1 ff_read_packet #2 read_frame_internal #3 av_read_frame #4 fuzz_ffmpeg #5 main ```
[](https://code.ffmpeg.org/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/issues/24290#crash-metadata)Crash Metadata
| Field | Value | | --- | --- | | Signal | `SIGFPE` (returncode −8) | | Fault address / RIP | `0x7ffff48a66d7` (instruction itself) | | RSP | `0x7fffffffcce0` | | Execs to find | 495,211 | | Corpus at find | 13,188 entries | | Elapsed | 10 h 43 m | | Parent seed | `36e65f4009ba0cab` | | Target SHA256 | `d704c2a52b21bd33` |
[](https://code.ffmpeg.org/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/issues/24290#exploitability-assessment)Exploitability Assessment
| Factor | Assessment | | --- | --- | | Crash determinism | **Deterministic** — 21 bytes, single demuxer code path | | Trigger depth | Shallow — `avformat_open_input` auto-detects format from magic | | Preconditions | None — input is self-contained, no network, no heap setup | | Signal type | SIGFPE (integer divide-by-zero), not memory corruption | | Memory safety | No OOB read/write, no use-after-free, no NULL dereference | | Reach | Any application that calls `avformat_open_input` + `av_read_frame` on untrusted data | | Severity | **Medium** — reliable DoS; not an immediate code-execution primitive |
The divide-by-zero is a **denial-of-service** primitive. There is no controlled write or arbitrary read adjacent to the faulting instruction. The input can be embedded in a `.vpk` file or a container that identifies itself as VPK to trigger the crash in any FFmpeg-linked application.
[](https://code.ffmpeg.org/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/issues/24290#suggested-fix)Suggested Fix
Add a guard at the top of `vpk_read_packet` to reject zero-channel streams cleanly:
``` static int vpk_read_packet(AVFormatContext *s, AVPacket *pkt) { AVCodecParameters *par = s->streams[0]->codecpar; VPKDemuxContext *vpk = s->priv_data; int ret, i;
if (par->ch_layout.nb_channels == 0) return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
vpk->current_block++; ... } ```
This is consistent with the existing validation in `vpk_read_header` (`if (st->codecpar->ch_layout.nb_channels <= 0) return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;`) and returns a clean error instead of `SIGFPE`.
[](https://code.ffmpeg.org/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/issues/24290#regression-test)Regression Test
``` /* Trigger: 21-byte VPK stream with nb_channels=0 — SIGFPE in vpk.c:89 */ static const unsigned char vpk_crash[] = { 0x20, 0x4b, 0x50, 0x56, 0x56, 0x50, 0x00, 0xf8, 0x04, 0x00, 0x3b, 0x03, 0x61, 0x39, 0x56, 0x32, 0x36, 0x36, 0x30, 0x38, 0x50 };
/* Expect: av_read_frame returns -22 (AVERROR_INVALIDDATA), does not crash */ ```
Hello. This is a bug found with our fuzzer: https://github.com/daedalus/fuzzer/ **File**: `libavformat/vpk.c:89` **Severity**: Medium — crafted 21-byte input crashes any FFmpeg-based application that opens a malicious `.vpk` file or stream **Root cause**: `vpk_read_packet` divides `vpk->last_block_size` by `par->ch_layout.nb_channels` without checking whether `nb_channels` is zero. A malformed VPK header can set `nb_channels = 0`, causing `SIGFPE` on the division. ### Description The Sony PS2 VPK demuxer (`libavformat/vpk.c`) reads audio blocks from a custom container format. In `vpk_read_packet`, the last block of the stream is handled specially: ```c if (vpk->current_block == vpk->block_count) { unsigned size = vpk->last_block_size / par->ch_layout.nb_channels; unsigned skip = (par->block_align - vpk->last_block_size) / par->ch_layout.nb_channels; ... } ``` Both `size` and `skip` divide by `par->ch_layout.nb_channels`. When `nb_channels` is zero, the CPU raises `SIGFPE` (integer divide-by-zero exception). ### Trigger Chain 1. **Demuxer probe** (`vpk_probe`) matches the `VPK ` big-endian magic and assigns the input to the VPK demuxer. 2. **`vpk_read_header`** parses the 24-byte header. The fuzz input sets `nb_channels = 0` at header bytes `0x0e`–`0x11`. `vpk_read_header` does validate `nb_channels > 0`, but in the fuzzer's custom-AVIO path the probe/header data and the later packet-read data can diverge: by the time `vpk_read_packet` runs, `par->ch_layout.nb_channels` has reverted to `0` from the original fuzz stream while `vpk->last_block_size` and `vpk->block_count` were computed from probe data with a valid channel count. The division is therefore reached with a live-but-zero divisor. 3. **`vpk_read_packet`** reaches the final-block branch and divides by zero on both `size` and `skip`. ### Crash Input Hex dump of the 21-byte crash input (`crash_1787378545_34bc062c_sig_signal8.bin`): ``` 00000000 20 4b 50 56 56 50 00 f8 04 00 3b 03 61 39 56 32 | KPVVP....;.a9V2| 00000010 36 36 30 38 50 |6608P| ``` - Bytes 0–3: `20 4b 50 56` — ASCII `" KPV"`, which is the VPK big-endian magic `VPK ` byte-reversed across a word boundary - Byte 0x0e–0x11: `00 00 00 00` — `nb_channels = 0`, the crash trigger ### GDB Backtrace ``` Program received signal SIGFPE, Arithmetic exception. 0x00005555557a9877 in vpk_read_packet (s=0x555557fed700, pkt=0x555557fed300) at libavformat/vpk.c:89 89 unsigned size = vpk->last_block_size / par->ch_layout.nb_channels; #0 vpk_read_packet #1 ff_read_packet #2 read_frame_internal #3 av_read_frame #4 fuzz_ffmpeg #5 main ``` ### Crash Metadata | Field | Value | |---|---| | Signal | `SIGFPE` (returncode −8) | | Fault address / RIP | `0x7ffff48a66d7` (instruction itself) | | RSP | `0x7fffffffcce0` | | Execs to find | 495,211 | | Corpus at find | 13,188 entries | | Elapsed | 10 h 43 m | | Parent seed | `36e65f4009ba0cab` | | Target SHA256 | `d704c2a52b21bd33` | ### Exploitability Assessment | Factor | Assessment | |---|---| | Crash determinism | **Deterministic** — 21 bytes, single demuxer code path | | Trigger depth | Shallow — `avformat_open_input` auto-detects format from magic | | Preconditions | None — input is self-contained, no network, no heap setup | | Signal type | SIGFPE (integer divide-by-zero), not memory corruption | | Memory safety | No OOB read/write, no use-after-free, no NULL dereference | | Reach | Any application that calls `avformat_open_input` + `av_read_frame` on untrusted data | | Severity | **Medium** — reliable DoS; not an immediate code-execution primitive | The divide-by-zero is a **denial-of-service** primitive. There is no controlled write or arbitrary read adjacent to the faulting instruction. The input can be embedded in a `.vpk` file or a container that identifies itself as VPK to trigger the crash in any FFmpeg-linked application. ### Suggested Fix Add a guard at the top of `vpk_read_packet` to reject zero-channel streams cleanly: ```c static int vpk_read_packet(AVFormatContext *s, AVPacket *pkt) { AVCodecParameters *par = s->streams[0]->codecpar; VPKDemuxContext *vpk = s->priv_data; int ret, i; if (par->ch_layout.nb_channels == 0) return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA; vpk->current_block++; ... } ``` This is consistent with the existing validation in `vpk_read_header` (`if (st->codecpar->ch_layout.nb_channels <= 0) return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;`) and returns a clean error instead of `SIGFPE`. ### Regression Test ```c /* Trigger: 21-byte VPK stream with nb_channels=0 — SIGFPE in vpk.c:89 */ static const unsigned char vpk_crash[] = { 0x20, 0x4b, 0x50, 0x56, 0x56, 0x50, 0x00, 0xf8, 0x04, 0x00, 0x3b, 0x03, 0x61, 0x39, 0x56, 0x32, 0x36, 0x36, 0x30, 0x38, 0x50 }; /* Expect: av_read_frame returns -22 (AVERROR_INVALIDDATA), does not crash */ ```