India’s Unconvincing Economic Facade
- India portrays itself as a, or even the, global growth leader. The rest of the world should recognize that the reliability of India’s economic data is low.
- This is clear in external statistics—trade competitiveness is weak despite what is supposed to be an indispensable labor force. Foreign investors limit exposure upon discovering India’s shortfalls.
- The most important failing is internal. India’s workers will not be young forever, and the government hides the extent of unemployment.
- Policy remains unhelpful. A distorted labor market effectively paralyzes land reform, and government borrowing to limit economic pain would make no sense if India were truly succeeding.
Indian policymakers and analysts frequently blame the external environment for economic problems, the dramatic US-Iran war being only the most recent example. In fact, the Indian economy has not performed exceptionally well when external conditions have been benign. Decently, yes, but not exceptionally. A lack of statistical credibility undermines claims that India has for many years been the fastest-growing (major) economy.1 Complementary claims that sound fundamentals will lead to sustained future success are deeply flawed.
Indian government borrowing is substantial and poorly justified. Trade competitiveness shows little improvement, and foreign investor interest is mirrored by rejection of durable exposure. The government deliberately obscures contributions from the most important fundamental—a huge cohort of young workers—possibly because its policies ensure much of the labor force is sidelined. This is especially worrisome because now is the time for demographics to push India rapidly forward. It’s not happening.n
India’s most recent official numbers look quite good on the surface. The government estimates real GDP growth for fiscal year 2026 at 7.7 percent. It was 7.1 percent the year before, an acceleration supposedly occurring despite effects from the Iran war showing up in March. However, nominal GDP grew 8.9 percent, the slowest growth since a contraction caused by the COVID outbreak.2 The credibility of “real” GDP depends first on its implicit deflator, whose accuracy is a long-standing issue.
In the Ministry of Statistics June 2026 press release, the GDP deflator was somehow smaller than the implicit deflators for the major components of GDP.3 In this way or others, and for years, the GDP deflator has been smaller than other price measurements much of the time,4 meaning real GDP growth may have been repeatedly exaggerated.
Right now, the overarching question is how an economy that has always struggled to equilibrate supply and demand can supposedly grow rapidly for a number of quarters without triggering an inflationary response. This has been described as a “Goldilocks” phase,5 but why the Goldilocks phase might have suddenly emerged is unclear. In contrast, the political incentive to manipulate GDP data is always clear.
There are accounting issues with the aptly named “discrepancies.” Perhaps unsurprisingly, the statistical presentation of discrepancies does not seem to make sense, with the on-year change figures being the same as the share of GDP. More to the point, the contribution of discrepancies to GDP growth has at times been unreasonably large, suggesting that the latter is exaggerated, just as with the deflator.6
The mediocre quality of GDP accounting can grab headlines but is not the most serious problem. A range of indicators do not correspond to a vibrant economy. Power supplied by state providers, which are dominant in the industry, rose only 1 percent in fiscal year 2026. Some blamed this on good weather. But the result for calendar year 2024 was also the slowest since the pandemic and notably slower than nominal GDP growth—a strange outcome for a developing economy that should become more power hungry.7
The financial side also raises questions. The vast majority of the population has little to invest, as reflected by more than 800 million people still receiving free food in calendar 2025. Those who can invest voted no confidence in domestic assets in fiscal 2026, with gold imports jumping 24 percent to $72 billion.8 Internally, the primary interest rate has sizably declined over the past decade, with a long period of low rates promised to come.9 This is standard for slow-growing economies and aging societies. India is not yet the second and insists it is not the first.
Externally, the rupee has hit annual lows against the dollar for the past eight years.10 If the economy has really been thriving, the obvious explanation is currency manipulation. The alternative is that, whatever true GDP growth, it is not impressing participants in the country’s external sector.
The weak rupee has a number of other implications. One concerns India as “the new China.” Time series data for Indian GDP run into a ridiculous number of estimates from the Ministry of Statistics, but the finalized figures show GDP climbing an impressive 345 percent from fiscal 2012 to fiscal 2024.11 In constant rupees, GDP essentially doubled. In current dollars, the World Bank shows GDP a bit more than doubling. A 12-year period for China that starts at either the equivalent GDP per capita to India or the equivalent period in its reform era shows closer to a 600 percent increase in current dollars.12 India is beaten soundly on a local currency basis and far worse in dollars, due to the rupee’s decline. (See Figure 1.)
Narendra Modi’s government could counter that the growth proof is in the pudding—its effects. Unfortunately, the pudding is sparse. The main event for the benefits of growth is jobs. There have long been claims that India needs many millions of new jobs created each year to absorb new labor market entrants stemming from its young population. The government itself said nearly eight million new _nonfarm_ jobs are needed annually until the decade ends.13 And it says this is happening. While labor market data as a whole are unclear, the government has reported unemployment for those age 15 and older as low as 3.1 percent and rural unemployment as low as 2.4 percent for calendar year 2025.14 What are you all on about? India has no jobs problem!
There are a number of issues with official job statistics. Looming over them all is a manifestly ridiculous definition of unemployment:
> According to the Current Weekly Status (CWS) approach, a person was considered as unemployed in a week if he/she did not work even for 1 hour on any day during the reference week but sought or was available for work at least for 1 hour on any day during the reference week.15
And if employed under this definition for 30 days, a person is considered employed for the year. Thirty hours can technically qualify as employment for a year. On government statistics, women worked an average of 71 minutes a day in 2024—more than enough to be employed, far less than enough to support themselves.16 This mockery should have become less necessary if fast GDP growth represented improving economic conditions.
Not surprisingly, the existing standards mask all sorts of unpleasant outcomes. There was a sharp drop in unemployment reported during the height of the pandemic, which would make sense only if people took worse jobs out of desperation.17 In 2025, self-employment exceeded 62 percent. “Casual labor” is another 23 percent of employment and unlikely to be lucrative. Standard wage-salary employment is only 14 percent of the core labor force.18 The average number of workers at unincorporated firms is about 1.6—these are barely going concerns.19 Many jobs the government triumphantly counts may be unable to support a decent life.
The evolution of labor by sector is discouraging. The World Bank puts the share of agricultural labor—42 percent of the total—at the same level in 2025 as 2017,20 which is hardly the development ideal. This is partly explained by the pandemic, and it further illustrates low job quality—workers went back to farms, and official data called it a success.
The manufacturing side is grim in light of needing eight million nonfarm jobs annually. At one point, a senior official bragged about 15 million jobs being created over nine years in nine major sectors, including manufacturing. This would be utterly inadequate. Over a slightly shorter period, official data showed over five million manufacturing jobs lost at unincorporated firms.21 In response, the government occasionally resorts to nonsense such as assuming tourism jobs will double or triple, possibly nearing 10 percent of the total population.22
From 2000 to 2025, India’s median age rose from 21.2 to 28.8, a healthy increase toward the ideal. By 2050, though, it’s projected to rise faster to 38.3, which was America’s median age in 2024.23 That projection may turn out to be optimistic, since fertility has fallen behind replacement level in the most recent data.24 It’s odd that a supposedly booming country would see low fertility so early in the development cycle.
What’s sure is India has one and only one generation of demographic conditions conducive to rapid growth. It has not taken proper advantage to date, tries to hide this fact, and retains policies inimical to a labor-driven boom. (See the policy failure section below.)
**Trade and Investment**
The global economy is often blamed for Indian downturns yet imagined as a future boon, because India’s fundamentals ensure rising competitiveness. For this to make sense, the world’s largest labor force should see at least a trend toward shrinking trade deficits (even though such deficits are not always harmful or even informative). The trend is not there. Fiscal 2026 saw the second-highest overall deficit on record, widening sharply from the previous year. The problem is certainly not services, where a large surplus expanded again in fiscal 2026 and comparative advantage is on display.25 Instead, it’s goods, as the non-oil trade deficit shattered its previous record in fiscal 2023, then set new records in 2025 and again in 2026.26
India had a 1.8 percent share of global manufacturing exports in 2024 (the year with the latest available data), with a share of world population nearly 10 times that.27 Cell phone exports have done quite well recently; other electronic exports have not.28 Textiles should be an intense Indian comparative advantage, yet exports inched only 2 percent higher in fiscal 2026. In dollar terms, they’re lower than in fiscal 2022.29 Aggregate and industry results show a country generally failing to become more competitive, even as it touts future gains from globalization.
And this has occurred despite rupee depreciation. The real effective exchange rate for the rupee has dropped like a stone since late 2024, back to spring 2014 levels.30 The Modi government claims a strong economy that does not show in rupee valuation, yet has not capitalized in trade on the latter’s weakness.
The rupee performance highlights trade failure but does partly explain uneven results for inward investment, as foreigners are less impressed by profits denominated in rupees. Gross foreign direct investment is promising, reaching another new high in fiscal 2026.31 Less than a quarter, though, is in manufacturing.32 Moreover, Singapore easily leads as both the source of inward direct investment and the recipient of outward direct investment.33 Singapore is a global center for capital cycling, raising the question of how much of the money entering India is just returning capital, bringing with it no innovation. This concern is complemented by the volume of money leaving India.
In net inward direct investment as a percentage of GDP, India historically compares poorly with Vietnam, a development peer with 7 percent of the population (Figure 2). Since 2020, net inward direct investment has plunged to almost nothing. An odd rally late in fiscal 2026 was an improvement over previous years, but amounts were still negligible on a per capita basis.34 There have been painfully few registrations of new foreign companies annually, fewer than 150 in 2024 and 2025 combined.35 One reason it’s unappealing to enter is it’s unpleasant to exit, in particular due to labor laws making it difficult to end payments when operations end.36
In fiscal 2024, such struggles were countered by sizable inflows of portfolio capital. In 2025, however, the portfolio capital dried up to almost nothing, and fiscal 2026 saw net portfolio outflows starting well before the US attack on Iran.37 On a net basis including portfolio flows, capital left India in fiscal 2026. This does not fit well with rapid economic growth. The Iran war caused fiscal 2027 to get off to a poor start, with net portfolio investment falling to a decade low.38 As a group, foreign investors have not seen India’s recent development as a worthwhile project, clashing with the government’s claims.
Investor aversion stems from land and labor policies, themselves tied to an inconsistent development model. India talks up infrastructure development, but land ownership is a hindrance. It wants to boost manufacturing and exports, but labor policies frighten employers. Payroll deductions for low-wage employees have discouraged work.39
The headline failure is the requirement that “large” companies must have government permission to fire workers. A seemingly important step forward was taken in late 2025 when the threshold defining large was raised from 100 employees to 300 nationally.40 Firms will be more willing to expand past 100 employees, since they’ll retain labor flexibility instead of being trapped by payroll during downturns. Until they hit 300. The result will be many firms with 299 employees rather than 99. Better than it was; still horribly self-defeating.
If India wants to substitute for imports at scale, and certainly if it wants to soar up the ranks of global manufacturing exporters, it will need truly large firms. Yet it has formalized a powerful disincentive to expand. If 300 is better than 100, why not 400 or 500 or 3,000? Labor laws were temporarily weakened during the pandemic because many state governments recognized they are economically harmful.41 There have been no government assessments of the size of firms that contribute most to productive activity; the constraint is purely political. The government wants to brag about the labor force’s potential but lacks the courage to actually tap it.
Poor labor absorption has crushing implications. In addition to capping incomes and competitiveness, it prevents proper land reform. Land reform that improves productivity would mean fewer people are needed for farming, but firms hire less than the ideal because they want to keep payroll flexibility. As a result, there is no place for unnecessary rural laborers to go; they are stuck being unproductive and poor.
Land policy is not driven by food security; it has not been for years. Food stocks are so much larger than target levels that the major issue is now waste.42 Two land numbers are devastating: the 800 million mostly rural people getting free food and the latest official numbers showing the average size of agricultural landholdings falling for decades to barely over one hectare in 2016 (outdated because the Modi government has failed to perform a national census).43 These are connected—one hectare is not enough to feed a family.
There is reason for hope in the belated creation of proper landownership data so that transactions are less contested.44 Even when this is done, however, ensuing sales that put land to its most efficient uses will largely be disallowed. Sales could make for extraneous workers who have no other option. Rural productivity and income will remain painfully low, capping development.
The need for rural support helps explain the fiscal contradiction: a supposedly fast-growing lower-income economy continually running deficits exceeding 4 percent of GDP. The central government’s outstanding liabilities more than tripled from fiscal 2016 to fiscal 2026, the problem predating the pandemic (Figure 3).45 The leveraging has had the usual self-reinforcing result: Nearly one-fourth of spending in fiscal 2026 was funded by borrowing, and one-fifth went to interest payments. The state level looks no better, with states’ expenditure easily outrunning nominal GDP since 2011.46 For a lower-income economy, especially, government spending should not be faster than nominal GDP for an extended period.
The implication of this deterioration is unpleasant. Indian central government borrowing and interest payment numbers are comparable to or a bit worse than the American federal budget, except the US is vastly richer.47 Running large budget deficits while announcing fast growth is a common international failing. Further, credit growth in fiscal 2026 was close to 16 percent, blowing past nominal GDP.48 Borrowing consistently at India’s stage in the development cycle is a common failing as well, at least for countries that cannot escape middle income.
India claims growth leadership and strong fundamentals. The former is not well supported in the data. The latter flies in the face of obviously manipulated employment statistics, weak trade competitiveness, and foreign investor distrust. The policy set also fits an India pretending to be more successful than it actually is—discouraging hiring at scale while spending like a slow-growth rich country.
**Derek Scissors** is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he focuses on the Chinese and Indian economies and US economic relations with Asia. He is concurrently the chief economist of the China Beige Book.
1. Times News Network, “Despite Global Headwinds, India to Remain Fastest-Growing Economy: RBI,” _The Times of India_, January 21, 2026, [https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/despite-global-headwinds-india-to-remain-fastest-growing-economy-rbi/articleshow/127012014.cms](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/despite-global-headwinds-india-to-remain-fastest-growing-economy-rbi/articleshow/127012014.cms); and _Financial Express_, “Union Budget 2026: What Is ‘Goldilocks Economy’ and Why It Matters to India,” February 3, 2026, [https://www.financialexpress.com/business/news/union-budget-2026-what-is-goldilocks-economy-and-why-it-matters-to-india/4126413/](https://www.financialexpress.com/business/news/union-budget-2026-what-is-goldilocks-economy-and-why-it-matters-to-india/4126413/).
2. Government of India, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, National Statistics Office, _Press Note on Provisional Estimates of Annual Gross Domestic Product for 2025–26: Quarterly Estimates of Gross Domestic Product for the Fourth Quarter (January–March) of 2025–26_, June 5, 2026, 3, [https://www.mospi.gov.in/uploads/latestReleases/latest_release_1780655857536_5ac01869-ca4a-422d-b7a7-57b81da60932_Press_Note_on_GDP_Estimates_for_Q4_2025-26_and_PE_FY_2025-26_F.pdf](https://www.mospi.gov.in/uploads/latestReleases/latest_release_1780655857536_5ac01869-ca4a-422d-b7a7-57b81da60932_Press_Note_on_GDP_Estimates_for_Q4_2025-26_and_PE_FY_2025-26_F.pdf). 3. Government of India, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, National Statistics Office, _Press Note on Provisional Estimates of Annual Gross Domestic Product for 2025–26_.
4. For commentary, see Rajeswari Sengupta, “Is India’s Growth Rate Overestimated?,” _The Indian Express_, March 29, 2024, https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/is-indias-growth-rate-overestimated-9239003/. For data, compare the implicit GDP deflators in Ministry of Statistics announcements with the data at Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, “Consumer Price Index (CPI),” https://www.mospi.gov.in/themes/product/9-consumer-price-index-cpi#database; and World Bank Group, “Inflation, Consumer Prices (Annual %)—India,” https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG?locations=IN.
5. Nirmal Ganguly, “Fixing the Mirror: Why India’s GDP Deflator Needs Urgent Overhaul,” _MarketExpress_, November 17, 2025, https://www.marketexpress.in/2025/11/fixing-the-mirror-why-india-gdp-deflator-needs-urgent-overhaul.html; and _Financial Express_, “Union Budget 2026.”
6. Sumana Sarkar, “India’s Q1 GDP Stuns, but Here Are 5 Startling Contradictions You Cannot Ignore,” _Financial Express_, August 31, 2025, [https://www.financialexpress.com/policy/economy/indias-q1-gdp-stuns-but-here-are-5-startling-contradictions-you-cannot-ignore/3962401/](https://www.financialexpress.com/policy/economy/indias-q1-gdp-stuns-but-here-are-5-startling-contradictions-you-cannot-ignore/3962401/).
7. Rajesh Kumar Singh, “Electricity Consumption Sees Slowest Growth in Years on Cooler Weather,” _Business Standard_, April 17, 2026, [https://www.business-standard.com/economy/news/electricity-consumption-sees-slowest-growth-in-years-on-cooler-weather-126041700666_1.html](https://www.business-standard.com/economy/news/electricity-consumption-sees-slowest-growth-in-years-on-cooler-weather-126041700666_1.html); and Reuters, “India’s 2024 Power Output Growth Slowest Since Covid-19, Shows Data,” _Business Standard_, January 8, 2025, [https://www.business-standard.com/economy/news/india-s-2024-power-output-growth-slowest-since-covid-19-shows-data-125010800320_1.html](https://www.business-standard.com/economy/news/india-s-2024-power-output-growth-slowest-since-covid-19-shows-data-125010800320_1.html).
8. Press Trust of India, “Gold Imports Rise 24% to Hit All-Time High of $71.98 Billion in 2025–26,” _Business Standard_, April 17, 2026, [https://www.business-standard.com/economy/news/gold-imports-rise-24-to-hit-all-time-high-of-71-98-billion-in-2025-26-126041700837_1.html](https://www.business-standard.com/economy/news/gold-imports-rise-24-to-hit-all-time-high-of-71-98-billion-in-2025-26-126041700837_1.html); and Government of India, Press Information Bureau, _Securing Every Plate: India’s Multi-Faceted Mission to Ensure Food and Nutritional Equity for 81 Crore Citizens_, October 15, 2025, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2179514.
9. _Financial Express_, “RBI’s Latest Cut Extends a 10-Year Downward Trend in Repo Rate from 7.75%–5.25%: A Detailed Timeline,” December 8, 2025, [https://www.financialexpress.com/policy/economy-from-7-75-to-525-rbis-latest-cut-extends-a-10-year-downward-trend-in-repo-rate-4067152/](https://www.financialexpress.com/policy/economy-from-7-75-to-525-rbis-latest-cut-extends-a-10-year-downward-trend-in-repo-rate-4067152/); and Chris Kay et al., “India’s Central Bank Governor Signals Rates to Stay Low for ‘Long Period,’” _Financial Times_, December 17, 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/55cd3608-7f2a-485a-be17-37735947d619.
10. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Indian Rupees to U.S. Dollar Spot Exchange Rate,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, last updated June 8, 2026, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=4OL7. 11. Government of India, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, National Accounts Statistics, https://esankhyiki.mospi.gov.in/macroindicators?product=nas.
12. World Bank Group, “GDP (Current US$)—India,” https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=IN; and World Bank Group, “GDP (Current US$)—China,” https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=CN.
13. _The Economic Times_, “Economic Survey: India Needs to Create 78.5 Lakh New Non-Farm Jobs Annually till 2030,” January 31, 2025, [https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/economic-survey-india-needs-to-create-78-5-new-non-farm-jobs-annually-till-2030/articleshow/117769641.cms](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/economic-survey-india-needs-to-create-78-5-new-non-farm-jobs-annually-till-2030/articleshow/117769641.cms).
14. Government of India, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, National Statistics Office, _Annual Report: Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) (January–December 2025)_, March 2026, [https://www.mospi.gov.in/uploads/publications_reports/publications_reports1780040415321_0624fb13-fb47-40bc-b470-7c7e9635c3ef_PLFS_2025_F_REV_29052026.pdf](https://www.mospi.gov.in/uploads/publications_reports/publications_reports1780040415321_0624fb13-fb47-40bc-b470-7c7e9635c3ef_PLFS_2025_F_REV_29052026.pdf).
15. Government of India, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, National Statistics Office, _Quarterly Bulletin: Periodic Labour Force Survey (January–March 2026)_, May 11, 2026, 11, https://www.mospi.gov.in/uploads/publications_reports/Final_QB_Upload_Jan-March-2026.pdf.
16. Abhishek Waghmare, “Employment in India,” Data for India, last updated March 9, 2024, https://www.dataforindia.com/work-employment-in-india/; and Shiva Rajora, “Women Spent 71 Minutes a Day on ‘Work-Related Activities’ in 2024: Mospi,” _Business Standard_, February 25, 2025, [https://www.business-standard.com/economy/news/women-spend-10-minutes-more-daily-on-employment-related-work-mospi-data-125022501274_1.html](https://www.business-standard.com/economy/news/women-spend-10-minutes-more-daily-on-employment-related-work-mospi-data-125022501274_1.html).
17. _Financial Express_, “Labour Survey Reveals Sharp Drop in Jobless Rate in 2020–21,” June 15, 2022, https://www.financialexpress.com/policy/economy-labour-survey-reveals-sharp-drop-in-jobless-rate-in-2020-21-2560662/. 18. Government of India, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, National Statistics Office, _Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS): Annual Report 2025_.
19. Shiva Rajora, “Jobs in Unincorporated Sector Rose Marginally in Q2, Shows NSO Data,” _Business Standard_, November 25, 2025, [https://www.business-standard.com/economy/news/employment-in-unincorporated-sector-rose-marginally-in-q2-shows-nso-data-125112501140_1.html](https://www.business-standard.com/economy/news/employment-in-unincorporated-sector-rose-marginally-in-q2-shows-nso-data-125112501140_1.html). 20. World Bank Group, “Employment in Agriculture (% of Total Employment) (Modeled ILO Estimate)—India,” https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS?locations=IN.
21. Press Trust of India, “Over 15 Mn Jobs Created Across 9 Sectors Under Modi Govt: Bhupender Yadav,” _Business Standard_, August 28, 2023, [https://www.business-standard.com/economy/news/over-15-mn-jobs-created-across-9-sectors-under-modi-govt-bhupender-yadav-123082800555_1.html](https://www.business-standard.com/economy/news/over-15-mn-jobs-created-across-9-sectors-under-modi-govt-bhupender-yadav-123082800555_1.html); and Shiva Rajora, “Informal Entities in Manufacturing Lost 5.4 Million Jobs in 7 Years,” _Business Standard_, June 23, 2024, [https://www.business-standard.com/economy/news/informal-entities-in-manufacturing-lost-5-4-million-jobs-in-7-years-124062300500_1.html](https://www.business-standard.com/economy/news/informal-entities-in-manufacturing-lost-5-4-million-jobs-in-7-years-124062300500_1.html).
22. _Business Standard_, “Tourism Expected to Create 130–140 Mn Jobs by 2030: PM Modi at Rozgar Mela,” August 28, 2023, [https://www.business-standard.com/economy/news/tourism-expected-to-create-130-140-mn-jobs-by-2030-pm-modi-at-rozgar-mela-123082800349_1.html](https://www.business-standard.com/economy/news/tourism-expected-to-create-130-140-mn-jobs-by-2030-pm-modi-at-rozgar-mela-123082800349_1.html); and Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, “Travel, Tourism Sector to Add 5.82 Cr Jobs by 2033,” May 3, 2025, https://indbiz.gov.in/travel-tourism-sector-to-add-5-82-cr-jobs-by-2033/.
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24. Government of India, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, _National Family Health Survey (NFHS-6), 2023–24_, May 2026, https://www.nfhsiips.in/nfhsuser/assets/National%20Family%20Health%20Survey%20(NFHS-6)%202023-2024%20Fact%20Sheets.pdf%202023-2024%20Fact%20Sheets.pdf).
25. Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, “The Cumulative Exports (Merchandise & Services) During FY 2025–26 (April–March) Is Estimated at US$ 860.09 Billion[...],” press release, April 15, 2026, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2252272.
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27. Government of India, Ministry of Finance, “India’s External Performance Demonstrates Resilience to Global Shocks: Economic Survey 2025–26,” press release, January 29, 2026, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2219966; and World Bank Group, “Population, Total—India,” https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=IN.
28. Government of India, Ministry of Electronics and IT, “India Emerges as Second Largest Mobile Manufacturing Country; Smartphone Exports Lead in 2025,” press release, March 11, 2026, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2238427.
29. Government of India, Ministry of Textiles, “India’s Textile Exports Register Growth of 2.1% in FY 2025–26,” press release, April 22, 2026, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2254367; and Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Commerce, “Apparel and Garment Industry and Export,” https://indiantradeportal.in/vs.jsp?id=0,31,24100,24102.
30. Bank for International Settlements, “Real Broad Effective Exchange Rate for India,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, last updated May 21, 2026, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/RBINBIS.
31. _The Economic Times_, “FDI Equity Inflows Up 18% in FY26, US Investments Double,” June 5, 2026, [https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/indicators/fdi-equity-inflows-up-18-in-fy26-us-investments-double/articleshow/131516550.cms](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/indicators/fdi-equity-inflows-up-18-in-fy26-us-investments-double/articleshow/131516550.cms).
32. Reserve Bank of India, “No. 35: Foreign Investment Flows,” May 2026, https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Bulletin/PDFs/35T_BULL220520268C9207B0EDD44081B5E5E01BCA2E6B78.PDF; and Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, “India Records USD 81.04 Billion FDI Inflow in FY 2024–25,” press release, May 27, 2025, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2131716.
33. _The Economic Times_, “FDI Equity Inflows Up 18% in FY26, US Investments Double”; and Sugata Ghosh, “RBI Tightens Scrutiny of Overseas Investments as Outflows Surge to $27 Billion in FY26,” _The Economic Times_, May 18, 2026, [https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/finance/rbi-tightens-scrutiny-of-overseas-investments-as-outflows-surgeto-27-billion-in-fy26/articleshow/131161162.cms](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/finance/rbi-tightens-scrutiny-of-overseas-investments-as-outflows-surgeto-27-billion-in-fy26/articleshow/131161162.cms).
34. World Bank Group, “Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (% of GDP)—India,” https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS?locations=IN; and Aathira Varier, “Net FDI into India Rises Sharply to $7.65 Billion in FY26: RBI Data,” _Business Standard_, May 22, 2026, [https://www.business-standard.com/economy/news/net-fdi-into-india-rises-sharply-to-7-65-billion-in-fy26-rbi-data-126052201682_1.html](https://www.business-standard.com/economy/news/net-fdi-into-india-rises-sharply-to-7-65-billion-in-fy26-rbi-data-126052201682_1.html).
35. Anoushka Sawhney, “Foreign Company Registrations in India Hit 5-Yr High in 2025, Service Sector Account for 87%,” _The Economic Times_, February 8, 2026, [https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/indicators/foreign-company-registrations-in-india-hit-5-yr-high-in-2025-service-sector-account-for-87/articleshow/128081247.cms](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/indicators/foreign-company-registrations-in-india-hit-5-yr-high-in-2025-service-sector-account-for-87/articleshow/128081247.cms).
36. Shan Li, “Setting Up a Business in India Is Hard. Leaving Is Even Harder.,” _The Wall Street Journal_, September 21, 2025, https://www.wsj.com/business/setting-up-a-business-in-india-is-hard-leaving-is-even-harder-283baadf.
37. Reserve Bank of India, _Reserve Bank of India Bulletin_, April 2026, https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Bulletin/PDFs/0BULT23042026FL5A726E38FAF84453B435F18A3709DD11.PDF; Veena Venugopal, “Foreign Investors’ Exit from India at Record High,” _Financial Times_, May 12, 2026, https://www.ft.com/content/b64c331b-76f3-4326-807c-3513e6d862b6; and _The Times of India_, “FPI Selling: Foreign Investors Pull Rs 27,000 Crore in May; 2026 Outflows Cross Rs 2.2 Lakh Crore Mark,” May 17, 2026, [https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/fpi-selling-foreign-investors-pull-rs-27000-crore-in-may-2026-outflows-cross-rs-2-2-lakh-crore-mark/articleshow/131150641.cms](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/fpi-selling-foreign-investors-pull-rs-27000-crore-in-may-2026-outflows-cross-rs-2-2-lakh-crore-mark/articleshow/131150641.cms).
38. Ashutosh Joshi, “Global Investment into India’s Stock Market Falls to Decade Low,” Bloomberg, June 2, 2026, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-06-02/global-funds-pull-out-a-decade-s-worth-of-india-equity-inflows.
39. Manish Sabharwal and Jayshri Patil, “End Employed Poverty: Mandatory 35% Payroll Deduction for Low-Wage Employees Hurts Formal Job Creation,” _Financial Express_, July 17, 2024, [https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/end-employed-poverty-mandatory-35-payroll-deduction-for-low-wage-employees-hurts-formal-job-creation/3555796/](https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/end-employed-poverty-mandatory-35-payroll-deduction-for-low-wage-employees-hurts-formal-job-creation/3555796/).
40. Government of India, Ministry of Labour and Employment, _Compliance Handbook for Employers Under the Four Labour Codes (Central Government Sphere)_, February 19, 2026, https://www.labour.gov.in/static/uploads/2026/02/83978455025732b99b0165def80ab171.pdf; and Reuters, “India’s New Labour Codes: What They Mean for Workers and Businesses,” November 21, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/world-at-work/indias-new-labour-codes-what-they-mean-workers-businesses-2025-11-21/.
41. Samrat Sharma, “India Moves Big Labour Law Changes to Limit Coronavirus Impact; UP, MP, Punjab, Others Make These Changes,” _Financial Express_, May 8, 2020, [https://www.financialexpress.com/policy/economy-labour-reforms-laws-rules-change-uttar-pradesh-up-madhya-pradesh-rajasthan-himachal-pradesh-punjab-kerala-coronavirus-reforms-1952023/](https://www.financialexpress.com/policy/economy-labour-reforms-laws-rules-change-uttar-pradesh-up-madhya-pradesh-rajasthan-himachal-pradesh-punjab-kerala-coronavirus-reforms-1952023/).
42. Press Trust of India, “Government’s Foodgrain Stocks Hit 604 Lakh Tonnes, Nearly Three Times Buffer Requirement,” _The Economic Times_, May 6, 2026, [https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/agriculture/governments-foodgrain-stocks-hit-604-lakh-tonnes-nearly-three-times-buffer-requirement/articleshow/130853759.cms](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/agriculture/governments-foodgrain-stocks-hit-604-lakh-tonnes-nearly-three-times-buffer-requirement/articleshow/130853759.cms).
43. Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare, Press Information Bureau, “Decrease in Agricultural Holdings,” press release, March 3, 2020, https://www.pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=199780.
44. _The Economic Times_, “After GST Revamp, Another Critical Reform Is Loading,” September 17, 2025, [https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/after-gst-revamp-another-critical-reform-is-loading/articleshow/123945759.cms](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/after-gst-revamp-another-critical-reform-is-loading/articleshow/123945759.cms). 45. Reserve Bank of India, “Table 107: Outstanding Liabilities of Central Government,” August 29, 2025, https://rbi.org.in/Scripts/PublicationsView.aspx?id=23281.
46. _The Economic Times_, “India Budget 2026: Every Rupee Earned and Every Rupee Spent by Modi Govt,” February 1, 2026, [https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/finance/budget-2026-indian-rupee-sources-and-spending-where-the-rupee-comes-from-and-where-it-goes/articleshow/127832200.cms](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/finance/budget-2026-indian-rupee-sources-and-spending-where-the-rupee-comes-from-and-where-it-goes/articleshow/127832200.cms); and Jayajit Dash, “States’ Expenditure Rise 15% Annually Since 2011, Says Study,” _Business Standard_, July 2, 2019, [https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/states-expenditure-rise-15-annually-since-2011-says-study-118122800663_1.html](https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/states-expenditure-rise-15-annually-since-2011-says-study-118122800663_1.html).
47. See US Department of the Treasury, “How Much Has the U.S. Government Spent This Year?,” https://fiscaldata.treasury.gov/americas-finance-guide/federal-spending/; and UBS, _Global Wealth Databook 2023_, August 15, 2023, https://bibbase.org/f/nKAPSyp34A9azBzJd/Shorrocksetal2023.pdf.
48. _The Economic Times_, “Credit Growth Signals Economic Strength: Finance Ministry,” May 6, 2026, [https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/finance/credit-growth-signals-economic-strength-finance-ministry/articleshow/130838336.cms](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/finance/credit-growth-signals-economic-strength-finance-ministry/articleshow/130838336.cms).